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ON GRANDMOTHER CELLS
Based on considerable neurophysiological
evidence, Roy (2012) proposed the the-
ory that localist representation is widely
used in the brain, starting from the low-
est levels of processing. Grandmother cells
are a special case of localist representa-
tion. In this article, I present the theory
that grandmother cells are alsowidely used
in the brain. To support the proposed
theory, I present neurophysiological evi-
dence and an analysis of the concept of
grandmother cells. Konorski (1967) first
predicted the existence of grandmother
cells (he called them “gnostic” neurons)—
single neurons that respond to complex
stimuli such as faces, hands, expressions,
objects, and so on. The term “grand-
mother cell” was introduced by Jerry
Lettvin in 1969 (Barlow, 1995).
The notion of grandmother cells is very
controversial in neuro and cognitive sci-
ences. Barlow (2009, p. 320) claims that
grandmother cells exist and “can now
be recorded from and studied reliably.”
Bowers (2009) has also claimed that the
brain uses grandmother cells to code for
objects and concepts. However, Plaut and
McClelland (2010) and Quian Quiroga
et al. (2008; Quian Quiroga and Kreiman,
2010) have vigorously opposed the notion
of grandmother cells in the brain.
THE CONCEPT OF GRANDMOTHER CELLS
Grandmother cells have been character-
ized in a variety of ways. Here I reference
some:
• Gross (2002, p. 512): “The term “grand-
mother cell” refers to a neuron that would
respond only to a specific, complex, and
meaningful stimulus, that is, to a single
percept or even a single concept. As orig-
inally conceived, a grandmother cell was
multimodal, but the term came to be used
mostly for representing a visual percept.”
• Barlow (2009, p. 309): “The term grand-
mother cell started as a fanciful name
for a high-level neuron that might enable
us to experience complex perceptions
and discriminate among them. The con-
cept included invariance of response for
changes in some variables as well as selec-
tivity of response for others, together with
the idea that these cells are created by
processing at a hierarchy of levels.”
• Bowers (2009, p. 223): “In sum, the key
claim of localist coding schemes is that a
given unit (neuron) codes for one familiar
thing (and does not directly contribute to
the representation of anything else), and
that it is possible to interpret the output
of a single unit in a neural network.”
By localist representation, Bowers implies
grandmother cells.
THE GRANDMOTHER CELL REPRESENTS A
COMPLEX, ABSTRACT CONCEPT
For this article, let’s start with the stricter
definition that a grandmother cell repre-
sents a specific and complex concept, not
merely a percept, in a multimodal invari-
ant way. Thus, the basic grandmother cell
notion is about encoding a complex con-
cept within a single cell in an invari-
ant way. And abstract categories—such
as animals, cars, and houses—are, with-
out question, complex concepts. Category-
type concepts, therefore, are part of (or
included in) the notion of grandmother
cells. In other words, the grandmother cell
notion is not necessarily restricted to just
object-related concepts (such as the con-
cepts of Jennifer Aniston, Saddam Hussein,
and Eiffel Tower), but is inclusive of the
whole range of complex concepts. In a
more general sense, grandmother cells are
fundamentally about abstraction and gen-
eralization. We, therefore, need to find
evidence for the brain’s ability to gener-
alize and encode an abstract idea in a
single cell in an invariant way. For object-
related concepts, there is now plenty
of evidence for multimodal invariant
abstract cells that encode such concepts
(such as the concepts of Oprah Winfrey,
Saddam Hussein, and Sydney Opera) and
the evidence is presented in section The
Evidence for Modality Invariant Object-
related Concept Cells. There is also plenty
of evidence for category-related concept
cells, although they are primarily for visual
stimuli. But, in any modality, category
cells represent an abstraction about a set
of objects or features and reflect brain’s
ability to generalize, which is the essen-
tial feature of grandmother cells. And these
category cells are invariant to shape, size,
and other features of the objects in that
category. Thus, finding a category cell
in any modality can be counted as evi-
dence for grandmother cells. Section The
Evidence for Category Cells presents evi-
dence for category cells in the brain.
In the context of localist theory (Roy,
2012), grandmother cells are a special type
of localist cells. Roy (2012) has already
shown that localist cells in the brain have
“meaning and interpretation.” Therefore,
the output of a grandmother cell is also
interpretable and there is no need to revisit
the interpretability issue here.
THE EVIDENCE FOR MODALITY
INVARIANT OBJECT-RELATED
CONCEPT CELLS
In some experiments, reported in Quian
Quiroga et al. (2009) and others, they
found that single medial temporal lobe
(MTL) neurons can encode an object-
related concept irrespective of how it is
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presented—visual, textual, or sound. They
check the modality invariance properties
of a neuron by showing the subjects three
different pictures of the particular individ-
ual or object that a unit responds to and
their spoken and written names. In these
experiments, they found (Quian Quiroga
et al., 2009, p. 1308) “a neuron in the
left anterior hippocampus that fired selec-
tively to three pictures of the television host
Oprah Winfrey and to her written (stimu-
lus 56) and spoken (stimulus 73) name . . . .
To a lesser degree, the neuron also fired to
the actress Whoopi Goldberg. None of the
other responses were significant, including
other text and sound presentations.” They
also found a neuron in the entorhinal cor-
tex of a subject that responded (Quian
Quiroga et al., 2009, p. 1308) “selectively
to pictures of Saddam Hussein as well as to
the text “Saddam Hussein” and his name
pronounced by the computer . . . . There
were no responses to other pictures, texts, or
sounds.”
Quian Quiroga (2012, p. 588) reports:
“Another neuron responded to Halle
Berry—even when she was masked as
Catwoman, a character she played in
one of her movies . . . . These and many
other examples suggest that MTL neurons
encode an abstract representation of the
concept triggered by the stimulus. This
claim was tested more conclusively by pre-
senting the written names of these persons
or objects to the subjects, and it was found
that a large proportion of MTL neurons did
indeed respond to both the pictures and the
written names of a particular individual
(or object). For example, the hippocam-
pal neuron that fired selectively to pictures
of Halle Berry responded also to the letter
string “HALLE BERRY” (and not to other
names). Moreover, the selective responses of
these neurons could be triggered by stim-
uli in other sensory modalities, such as the
name of a person pronounced by a synthe-
sized voice . . . .”
Suthana and Fried (2012, p. 428) report
similar findings: “Thus, a neuron may
respond to a picture of the Sydney Opera
House and exhibit no response to 50 other
landmarks, yet also respond to many per-
mutations and physically different represen-
tations of the Sydney Opera House, seen
in color, in black and white, or from dif-
ferent angles. In fact, the neuron may also
respond to the iconic representation, namely
the words “Sydney Opera,” which is obvi-
ously different in its visual properties com-
pared with the image of this landmark.
Recently, it was shown that this invariance
crosses modalities, meaning that MTL neu-
rons may exhibit a selective and “invariant”
response to a particular stimulus out of 100
images and do so independently of the sen-
sory modality (visual image, audio, or writ-
ten iconic representations) through which
the stimulus was presented . . . .”
Quian Quiroga et al. (2008) estimate
that 40% of MTL cells are tuned to such
explicit representation.
THE EVIDENCE FOR MODALITY INVARIANT
CONCEPT CELLS BASED ON “THINKING”
ABOUT A CONCEPT
In the experiment by Cerf et al. (2010),
epilepsy patients played a game to con-
trol the display of two superimposed
images through four MTL neurons. Before
the experiment, researchers identified
four MTL neurons in each patient that
responded selectively to four different
images. One of the four images was
randomly selected to become the target
image. Each trial started with a short dis-
play of the target image (say of Jennifer
Aniston) followed by an overlaid hybrid
image of the target and one of the other
three images (a distractor image, say of
James Brolin). The patient was then told
to enhance the target image by focusing
his/her “thoughts” on it. (Note: Perhaps
internal imagery in the brain was used
by patients when asked to “think” about
a target image.) The initial visibility of
both images was at 50% and the visibility
of an image was increased or decreased
every 100ms based on the firing rates of
the four MTL neurons. In general, if the
firing rate of one neuron was higher com-
pared to the other, the image associated
with that neuron became more visible.
The trial was terminated when either one
of the two images was fully visible or after
a fixed time limit. The subjects success-
fully reached the target, which means the
target image was fully visible, in 596 out
of 864 trials (69.0%; 202 failures and 66
timeouts).
Note that if the target image was of
Jennifer Aniston that means that they
found a neuron that responded to Jennifer
Aniston images and not to others. And
that same Jennifer Aniston neuron was
activated by the patient by simply “think-
ing” about Jennifer Aniston. That indi-
cates the multimodal invariance property
of that Jennifer Aniston cell—multimodal
because it is triggered by both visual and
internal stimuli. And this experiment was
widely replicated—it was performed many
times on many patients.
THE EVIDENCE FOR CATEGORY CELLS
Cells that represent categories have been
found in both humans and animals. These
cells reflect brain’s ability to generalize and
create abstractions. The invariance prop-
erty is reflected in the fact that these
cells respond to a class of objects—objects
with varying shapes, sizes, and other fea-
tures. Fried et al. (1997) found some MTL
neurons that respond selectively to gen-
der and facial expression and Kreiman
et al. (2000) found MTL neurons that
respond to pictures of particular cate-
gories of objects, such as animals, faces,
and houses. Recordings of single-neuron
activity in the monkey visual temporal
cortex led to the discovery of neurons
that respond selectively to certain cate-
gories of stimuli such as faces or objects
(Logothetis and Sheinberg, 1996; Tanaka,
1996; Freedman and Miller, 2008).
I quote Freedman and Miller (2008):
“These studies have revealed that the activ-
ity of single neurons, particularly those in
the prefrontal and posterior parietal cortices
(PPCs), can encode the category member-
ship, or meaning, of visual stimuli that the
monkeys had learned to group into arbitrary
categories.”
Lin et al. (2007) report finding “nest
cells” in mouse hippocampus that fire
selectively when the mouse observes a nest
or a bed, regardless of the location or envi-
ronment.
Gothard et al. (2007) found single neu-
rons in the amygdala of monkeys that
responded selectively to images of mon-
key faces, human faces, and objects as they
viewed them on a computer monitor. They
found one neuron that responded in par-
ticular to threatening monkey faces. Their
general observation is (p. 1674): “These
examples illustrate the remarkable selectiv-
ity of some neurons in the amygdala for
broad categories of stimuli.”
Thus the evidence is substantial that
category cells exist in the brain and that the
brain can abstract and generalize.
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CONCLUSION
Grandmother cells are about abstract-
ing complex concepts and using sin-
gle units to encode and represent them.
There is obviously an efficiency aspect to
this. First, they provide information in
an abstracted, summarized, and tractable
form that can be easily exploited by
other units of the brain. Second, it avoids
interpreting an underlying pattern over
and over again by different parts of the
brain, where the pattern could be dis-
tributed over hundreds of thousands of
units at lower levels. Thus, simplification,
concreteness, automation, and computa-
tional efficiency are the key advantages
of grandmother cells or complex concept
cells.
Another powerful feature of grand-
mother and complex concept cells is easy
and efficient access to cognitive level infor-
mation, information that is interpretable
and has meaning at a higher level of
thought. Cognitive level information is no
longer elusive, but easily available through
these complex concept cells. The physical
embodiment of cognitive level informa-
tion within a set of complex concept cells
makes cognition and thought very real
and easily tractable within the brain. That
makes complex concept cells extremely
valuable and fundamental to the processes
that deal with cognition and thought.
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